*Observation window: March 21 to September 17, 2026, focusing on the last 90 days. This article examines the evidence that capital affects prices; available public materials have not proven illegal manipulation or insider trading. Prices use historical snapshots noted in each report and are not spliced into consecutive daily lines from the same exchange. *
Behind this round of ZEC market prices, there are names, positions, and clear interests: Multicoin’s early position building, Cypherpunk’s continued accumulation, Winklevoss Capital’s mining transactions, and Grayscale and DCG’s fund subscriptions.
Compressing it all into “the market discovered the value of privacy” erases the most critical details of the price formation process. What is really worth tracking is when the chips went into whose hands, when the news was made public, and what exactly were the numbers packaged as “fund influx”.
Starting from April: Listed companies continue to buy coins, and purchase records are more specific than slogans
The official Cypherpunk website lists the following records. The date is the date listed in the official website’s transaction history, which cannot be used to determine that all transactions occurred on that day; the average price is the purchase cost of the batch, not the closing price of the day.
| Official website record date | Increased ZEC | Average purchase price | Disclosure cost |
|---|---|---|---|
| April 15 | 9,163.32 coins | $234.63 | $2.15 million |
| May 14 | 10,279.30 coins | $486.41 | $5 million |
| June 17 | 6,846.37 coins | $496.61 | $3.4 million |
| August 12 | 2,362.31 pieces | $420.97 | About $1 million |
The total of the four transactions is approximately 28,651 pieces, US$11.55 million. This is a bid that can be named and cannot be taken as alternative evidence of the natural influx of countless independent users. Source: Cypherpunk Official Trading History
However, the purchase records do not disclose the complete execution venue and transaction-by-transaction, and it is impossible to calculate how much each purchase has pushed up the token price. Writing institutional currency purchases directly as “banker pulls” still lacks proof at the transaction level.
May 6: Positions are established first, the market hears the story later
CoinDesk reported that day that Multicoin had From February began to accumulate large ZEC positions; when publicly disclosed, the reported 24-hour market rose close to 30%, price approx. $543, with a 30-day increase of more than 110%. The trading volume during the same period exceeded $1.3 billion. Source: CoinDesk, May 6
The chronology is very clear: institutions first have price exposure and then explain the bullish logic to the public. Buying orders that subsequently enter the market can increase the book value of existing positions.
This does not mean insider trading, but it shows that the propaganda has a background of economic interests.The investment thesis of position holders cannot be regarded as an independent valuation conclusion.
On May 7, CryptoSlate quoted CoinGlass data as saying that ZEC’s open interest exceeded $1 billion, the 24-hour derivatives trading volume exceeds $7 billion. These figures reflect the scale of speculative transactions and cannot be interpreted as equal amounts of new cash, let alone the demand for private payments. Source: CryptoSlate
May 29 to June 5: Six-day information window followed by plunge
Shielded Labs’ original disclosure confirms that researchers discovered a serious Orchard vulnerability on May 29 and reported it to ZODL. A public statement followed on June 4. The vulnerability allowed tokens to be counterfeited within Orchard. The team considered prior exploitation unlikely, but at that point could not cryptographically rule it out. Source: Shielded Labs, June 4 announcement
On June 5, the Wall Street Journal reported that ZEC had fallen by about 40%. According to BIT’s subsequent review records, Arthur Hayes announced on June 5 that he would clear his ZEC position. Source: Wall Street Journal, BIT review
Three times must be distinguished here: discovering vulnerabilities, disclosing vulnerabilities, and actually selling.
There was a window between May 29 and June 4 where information was not fully public; this is not evidence that anyone was trading within the window. Security fixes often require coordinated disclosure. The existing materials do not connect the specific trading account, the time when the news was learned, and the selling record, nor can Hayes’ announcement time be regarded as the execution time of all transactions.
What this decline demonstrates is the rapidly changing pricing of technical risks. The so-called long-term belief does not guarantee that large investors will continue to hold when major risks arise.
August 12: 323,400 holdings, average cost $341.83
Cypherpunk’s quarterly results announcement states that, as of August 11, the company held 323,394.38 ZEC at an average purchase price of $341.83, representing approximately 1.92% of the circulating supply at that time. Source: Cypherpunk’s official earnings announcement
This set of data reveals cost differences among participants. Large holders of low-cost stocks bear completely different risks than those who later buy at high prices.
The same slogan of “long-term holding” does not mean that it has the same margin of safety. The public historical average cost does not represent the institution’s commitment to future positions.
August 18: $33.33 million in transactions, linking coin holdings to mining
Cypherpunk announced that it had acquired mining equipment and related hosting agreements through an equity transaction with Winklevoss Capital. The consideration was $33.33 million for approximately 4.2 GSol/s of hashrate, estimated at 18% of the network at the time of the announcement. Payment consisted of pre-funded warrants corresponding to 43,290,042 shares, issued to Winklevoss Treasury Investments. Source: Cypherpunk’s mining transaction announcement
This is a publicly verifiable capital link: the currency-holding company acquires the ability to produce new coins through equity transactions, and the counterparty gains equity exposure to the company.
This mining asset transaction cannot be written as a spot purchase order of US$33.33 million, nor can 18% of the computing power be written as 18% of the currency holding ratio. What it illustrates is that relevant capital participates in company equity, token holdings and mining assets at the same time. The interest relationship is much more complicated than “optimistic about privacy”.
August 25-26: ETFs rise pre-market, remain volatile post-market
According to a market review by 24/7 Wall St., ZEC rose approximately 65% in the week before the ETF launched on August 25. It reached approximately $880 on the launch date and fell back to around $784 the following day. Source: 24/7 Wall St., September 8 review
Based on these reported levels, US$880 to US$784 fell by approximately 10.9%. This is a change between specified points, not a full range return or maximum drawdown.
The increase occurred before the official listing. The listing of an ETF cannot be interpreted as the starting point of all market trends; the market will also trade in advance on public application progress and listing expectations. Therefore, “pre-news rise” alone is not enough to prove insider trading.
But it is enough to negate a kind of sales rhetoric: the launch of a new channel does not mean that subsequent buyers are still at the starting line of the market.
September 5-6: Shorts accounted for about 85% of liquidations, with forced liquidations a boost
U.Today’s report of the day cited CoinGlass data: ZEC liquidated approximately $13.24 million, of which the short position is approximately $11.26 million, long contract $1.98 million. Based on this calculation, the proportion of short positions is approximately 85%. Source: TradingView cited U.Today
The buying pressure created by the forced liquidation of short positions can continue to amplify the rise. It proves that there was a clear squeeze effect at the time. It cannot prove who deliberately launched the squeeze, nor does it prove that the entire increase was caused by liquidation.
Forced buying is not a vote of value, and the liquidation amount is not a new long-term investment.
On September 6, reported price highs were recorded at $1,249.28, up about $880 on August 25 42.0%. During this stage, both price overshoot and short-short liquidation occurred simultaneously; the coexistence of the two is not sufficient to determine the causal contribution alone. Source: 24/7 Wall St.
September 8: Behind the US$500 million scale, there are about US$100 million in physical subscriptions from related parties
ZCSH official announcement disclosed: the fund size exceeds $500 million; Since its listing on August 25, the cumulative inflow has exceeded $70 million, and DCG International Investments with 85,705.32563297 ZEC exchange agreement $100 million Fund shares. The investor and the fund sponsor belong to the same DCG system. The announcement also clarified that DCG and related parties will sell or liquidate digital assets including ZEC, and may also buy and sell ZCSH shares. Source: ZCSH official announcement, September 8
The most critical difference here is:Holding currency in exchange for shares does not mean that the same amount of cash is swept into the spot market on the same day; the scale of asset management does not mean the inflow of new funds.
To assess the spot impact, you also need to track when the coins used for subscription were obtained and where they came from. A fund size figure cannot be used as a substitute for real buying analysis.
Grayscale officials said during the same period that the fund held more than 550,000 ZEC. These are assets held by the fund for the share holders and cannot all be recorded as Grayscale’s proprietary positions, nor can they be directly added to the assets corresponding to the shares of related parties. Source: Grayscale official release
September 16: Hits $1,383.30 intraday, identity of buyers remains unexplained
The Defiant reported that on that day ZEC was traded on Coinbase from about $1,110.10 Open, touch during the session $1,383.30, the period covered by the report closed at about $1,320.12, an increase of about 18.9%, cross-exchange trading volume is approx. $2.19 billion. Source: The Defiant, September 16
This proves that the market is strong and the person who placed the order cannot be identified. The available materials do not provide sufficient accounting evidence to attribute this surge to new purchases by a certain institution. Filling in the unknown with “the banker continues to pull the market” will also weaken the credibility of the investigation.
BlackRock and Insider Trading: Missing Evidence Can’t Complete the Story
As of this search, no disclosures were found that could verify the amount of ZEC held directly by BlackRock and the timing of its purchases. This article confirms that the entities involved in the above incident include Multicoin, Cypherpunk, Winklevoss Capital, and Grayscale/DCG. Grayscale’s fund holdings cannot be moved to BlackRock’s name, nor can an asset management institution’s holdings of related company stocks automatically be interpreted as its direct purchase of ZEC.
Insider trading has also not been proven. The information window before vulnerability disclosure, early establishment of positions by institutions, and subscription by related parties respectively involve information management, investment decision-making, and capital relations; to prove the use of undisclosed information for transactions, specific accounts, time of knowledge, and transaction records are still required.
The criticism supported by this timeline is sharp enough:The price of ZEC cannot be explained by technical value alone. Public records show that institutional procurement, stakeholder advocacy, fund channels and forced liquidations all participate in market pricing.
The cost of large investors is not the cost of retail investors, the size of the fund is not spot buying, and the subscription of related parties is not unanimously recognized by independent capital. Hiding these differences in the four words “value discovery” is the most debunkable narrative of this round of market conditions.